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Abstract. We determine the optimal contract for the regulation of a bureaucratic firm in
the case in which the bureaucratic bias is firm’s private information. We find that output
is distorted upward when the bureaucratic bias is low, downward when it is high, and
equals a reference output when it is intermediate (in this case, the participation constraint
is binding). We also determine an endogenous reference output (equal to the expected
output, which depends on the reference output), and find that the response of output to
cost is null in the short-run (in which the reference output is fixed) whenever the managers’
types are in the intermediate range and negative in the long-run (after the adjustment of
the reference output to equal expected output).
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1 Introduction
Behavior of managers within firms is more complex than profit maximization. Its immediate
determinants are: salary, security, status, power, prestige, social service and professional
excellence (Niskanen, 1971). Observed willingness to manage a firm without significant
monetary incentives should be attributed to these non-monetary factors (Wilson, 1989).
The motivations of managers were synthesized and formalized by Williamson (1974), who
concluded that, in addition to a preference for profit, the management also displays a prefer-
ence for expenses in staff and emoluments. Such preference for expenditure may accentuate
the business cycle, by inducing a systematic accumulation of staff and emoluments during
prosperity, with divestment frequently becoming necessary during adversity.1
In general, the managerial discretion models (Maris, 1963; Williamson, 1974; Prender-
gast, 2007) aim to investigate implications of various hypotheses concerning the objec-
tive functions of managers, explicitly recognizing that these may not coincide with profit-
maximization.2 Although monetary incentives are relevant, the overwhelming evidence
indicates that the managers’ own preferences have the greatest effect on behavior (Brehm
and Gates, 1997). It is, therefore, important to hire managers with the “right” preferences
(Prendergast, 2007).
In the standard theory of regulation under asymmetric information (Baron and Myerson,
1982; Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984; Maskin and Riley, 1984; Laffont and Tirole, 1986), it is
assumed that the managers’ objective is the maximization of the monetary transfers that
they receive, net of the monetary value of the effort that they exert. Recently, Borges and
Correia-da-Silva (2008) generalized the model of Laffont and Tirole (1986) by allowing the
manager of the firm to have a preference for high output (bureaucratic bias) that was known
by the regulator. The intrinsic difficulty in the observation of preferences motivates us to
study the case in which the bureaucratic bias of the manager is his private information.3
1Baumol (1959) argued that some firms maximize sales subject to a profit constraint, thus producing
more than if they operated as profit maximizers.
2Empirical evidence of deviations from profit-maximization was provided by Chetty and Saez (2005) and
by Brown, Liang and Weisbenner (2007), who studied the response of corporations to the 2003 dividend
tax cut in the USA.
3The preference for output is equivalent to the preference for staff consider by Williamson (1974).
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We consider that the government (principal) offers a contract to a manager (agent) who
has an unobservable preference for high output (bureaucratic bias) for the provision of a
public good, with the objective of maximizing social welfare.4 The contract is accepted by
the manager if it provides a higher utility than his best outside option (managing a firm of
some given reference size).
Since the utility that the manager attributes to the output of the firm (bureaucratic bias)
is his private information, there is asymmetric information about the reservation utility of
the manager. As a consequence, the informational rent may not be monotonic, that is,
better types may not get higher rents (Jullien, 2000; Laffont and Martimort, 2002). In fact,
interior types may have a null rent or be excluded from trade.5
We obtain results which are worthwhile to compare with the results of standard models
of regulation and with the results of the managerial discretion models. Output turns out
to be an increasing function of the manager’s preference for output (bureaucratic bias).
This result is in line with managerial discretion theory but results from a quite different
mechanism. Instead of being the straightforward implication of managerial discretion over
output, it follows from the manager’s participation constraint: a larger output yields a larger
utility to the manager who, then, becomes willing to accept a lower monetary transfer.
We also find that output is distorted above the first-best optimal level when the preference
for output is low and above it when it is high. For intermediate values of the preference for
output, output equals its reference level (associated with the outside option). In this case,
unlike what is predicted by managerial discretion models, increases in marginal cost have
no effect on output.
Finally we study the case in which the reference output (size of the firm associated with
the outside option) is endogenous. More precisely, that it is equal to the expected output
of the firm, with respect to the manager’s distribution of types. Notice that this expected
value depends on the reference output itself. This case may be useful to understand better
the response of output to changes in cost. In the short-run (in which the reference output is
4More precisely, the government offers an incentive compatible set of contracts, one for each type of
manager.
5The informational rent is the difference between the utility that the manager attains and his reservation
utility (which is the attainable utility in the case of symmetric information).
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fixed), output does not respond to small variations in cost, whenever the managers’ types
are in the “intermediate” range (over which the participation constraint is binding). In
the long-run (after the adjustment of the reference output to equal expected output), the
sensitivity of output to cost becomes negative.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and section 3 analyzes
the benchmark case of complete information. In section 4 we derive the optimal incentive
scheme and provide the general results. Section 5 presents an illustration for quadratic
social value functions and an uniform distribution over types (with an exogenous reference
output and with an endogenous reference output). Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding
remarks.
2 The model
We consider a model of procurement in which the government (principal) delegates to a
firm (agent) the provision of a public good. The manager of the firm cares about profit, t,
but also about the output level, q. The manager’s utility function is:
U = t+ δq,
where δ, the marginal utility of output to the manager, is a private information parameter,
drawn according to a probability distribution over an interval
[
δ, δ
]
, with strictly positive
density, f(δ) > 0, and monotone hazard rates, d
dδ
[
f(δ)
1−F (δ)
]
> 0 and d
dδ
[
f(δ)
F (δ)
]
< 0 (where
F (δ) denotes the cumulative distribution function).
We assume that the manager has a type-dependent outside option that is proportional to
δ. For the manager to accept the contract, expected utility has to be larger than δqref (the
reservation utility). The output reference level, qref , is, for instance, the output level of the
firm that he would manage upon rejecting the regulator’s proposition:6
U(δ) ≥ δqref , ∀δ ∈
[
δ, δ
]
.7
6In Section 5.2, we propose an endogenous determination of the reference level of output.
7It would be equivalent to consider U(δ) = t+ δ(q − qref ), with participation for U(δ) ≥ 0.
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Of course that this covers the typical case in which U(δ) ≥ 0 (setting qref = 0).
The cost incurred by the firm is given by C = βq, where the firm’s marginal cost, β > 0,
is observable by the government. The social value of output is S(q), with marginal social
value being strictly positive and decreasing, S ′(q) > 0 and S ′′(q) < 0, for any q ∈ [0, q). We
also set S(0) = 0 and S ′(q) = 0 (where q can be interpreted as fully covering the needs of
the population).
The government finances the public good provision using a distortionary mechanism (taxes,
for example), so that the social cost of raising one unit of money is 1 + λ, with λ > 0. The
welfare of consumers is the difference between the social value of the public good and the
cost of financing its provision, S(q) − (1 + λ)(t + C). In the model of Laffont and Tirole
(1986, 1993) and, more generally, in the regulation literature, the government is assumed
to maximize the sum of the consumers’ welfare with the utility of the firm. With the
incorporation of a bureaucratic bias, it becomes natural to consider two possibilities:
(i) social welfare, W (δ), is the sum of the consumer’s welfare with the utility of the firm
(this case corresponds to setting k = 0, below);
(ii) social welfare, W (δ), is the sum of the consumer’s welfare with the profit of the
firm, while the bureaucratic component of the manager’s utility is excluded (corresponds
to setting k = 1, below).
In fact, we also allow for intermediate cases (any k ∈ [0, 1], below).
The problem of the government (maximization of expected social welfare) is:
max
q,t
∫ δ
δ
S(q)− (1 + λ)(t+ C) + U − kδq dδ (1)
subject to
U ≥ δqref . (2)
3 The case of complete information
As a benchmark, we study the case in which there is no asymmetry of information between
the government and the firm (the government is able to observe δ). Using the definitions
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of U and C, problem (1) can be written as:
max
q,U
{S(q)− (1 + λ) (β − δ) q − λU − kδq} (3)
subject to
U ≥ δqref . (2)
The first order condition of problem (3) is:
S ′(q) = (1 + λ) (β − δ) + kδ. (4)
And the second order condition is: S ′′(q) < 0.
We make the following assumptions for the problem to be well-behaved.
Assumption 1.
(i) λ > 0;
(ii) ∀q ∈ [0, q) , S ′′(q) < 0;
(iii) S ′(0) > (1 + λ) (β − δ) + kδ;
(iv) β > 1+λ−k
1+λ
δ.
Assumption (i) guarantees that the participation constraint is binding, (ii) ensures that the
second order condition is satisfied, (iii) ensures a positive output level, and (iv) is necessary
for the equilibrium output to be lower than q.
Since the participation constraint is binding, U∗c (δ) = δqref , and the net transfer is:
t∗c(δ) = δ [qref − q∗c (δ)] .
Observe that the net transfer, t∗c , is positive (negative) if and only if the optimal output,
q∗c , is lower (higher) than the reference output, qref .
The optimality condition (4) equates the marginal benefit of output to consumers, S ′(q),
and the social marginal cost. Using this condition, the optimal output level, q∗c , can be
determined. It is clear that when the regulator cares about the non-monetary component
of the manager’s utility (k = 0), the level of output is higher and the net monetary transfer
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is lower than when she does not care (k = 1). Observe also that the optimal output
level is an increasing function of the bureaucratic bias, even when the regulator does not
care at all about the utility that the manager derives from output (k = 1). This occurs
because increasing the output implies an increase in the non-monetary component of the
manager’s utility, decreasing, therefore, the monetary transfer which is necessary to induce
participation.
We also find that the social welfare, W ∗c (δ), is a convex function with respect to δ. Applying
the Envelope Theorem:8
dW ∗c
dδ
=
∂W ∗c
∂δ
= (1 + λ− k)q∗c − λqref .
Since q∗c is increasing in δ:
d2W ∗
dδ2
> 0.
With k = 1, the social welfare is increasing (decreasing) with the bureaucratic bias, δ, if
and only if the optimal output, q∗c , is higher (lower) than the reference output, qref .
In the following section, we determine the optimal procurement contract in the presence of
an unobserved bureaucratic bias.
4 The optimal incentive scheme
In the asymmetric information case, the government does not know the firm’s marginal
utility of output, δ. At the moment of contracting, the government only knows the prior
probability distribution of δ.
The government offers a contract to the firm, [q(δ˜), t(δ˜, C)], specifying an output, q(δ˜) and
a net payment, t(δ˜, C), that depend on the bureaucratic bias announced by the firm, δ˜.
Thanks to the Revelation Principle, we can restrict (without loss of generality) our attention
to incentive compatible direct revelation mechanisms.9
8See, for example, Chiang and Wainwright (2005).
9By the revelation principle (Myerson, 1979), given a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a game of incomplete
information, there exists a direct mechanism that has an equivalent equilibrium where the players truthfully
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4.1 The firms’s optimization problem
The government offers a contract to the firm such that the manager receives a net transfer
t(δ˜) when he produces the output level q(δ˜), and has to pay an extreme penalty t(δ˜) = −∞
if he produces some output level different from q(δ˜).
For any δ ∈ [δ, δ], truthful revelation must maximize the utility of the firm:
δ ∈ arg max
δ˜∈[δ,δ]
{
t(δ˜) + δq(δ˜)
}
. (5)
Let V (δ) be the firm’s value function (attainable utility as a function of δ):
V (δ) = max
δ˜∈[δ,δ]
{
t(δ˜) + δq(δ˜)
}
= t(δ) + δq(δ).
If announcing δ˜ 6= δ is not profitable (5), then the output, transfer and value functions are
almost everywhere differentiable (see Appendix A.1).
From the Envelope Theorem, we obtain the first order incentive compatibility constraint:
V ′(δ) = q(δ), (6)
which tells us that the derivative of the value function with respect to δ is equal to the
output level.
Integrating, we obtain:
V (δ) = V (δ) +
∫ δ
δ
q(γ)dγ. (7)
The second incentive compatibility constraint is derived from the second order condition of
utility maximization (see Appendix A.2):10
q′(δ) ≥ 0, ∀δ ∈ [δ, δ] . (8)
It implies that the output level is increasing with the manager’s bureaucratic bias.
report their types. A direct-revelation mechanism is said to be incentive compatible if, when each individual
is expecting the others to be truthful, then he/she has interest in being truthful.
10In Appendix A.3, it is shown that the first and second incentive compatibility constraints, (6) and (8),
are equivalent to truth-telling (5).
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4.2 The government’s optimization problem
The objective of the government is to maximize expected social welfare, Eδ [W (δ)]:
max
q(δ),V (δ)
∫ δ
δ
{S [q(δ)]− (1 + λ) (β − δ) q(δ)− λV (δ)− kδq(δ)} f(δ) dδ, (9)
subject to, for all δ ∈ [δ, δ],
V (δ) ≥ δqref , (10)
V ′(δ) = q(δ), (6)
q′(δ) ≥ 0. (8)
We start by solving a relaxed problem in which the second order incentive compatibility
condition (8) is ignored. Later, we will check that the solution of this relaxed problem is
the solution of the general problem (in Appendix B.2).
The participation constraint can be incorporated in the objective function:11
max
q(δ),V (δ)
∫ δ
δ
{S [q(δ)]− (1 + λ)(β − δ)q(δ)− λV (δ)− kδq(δ)} f(δ) +
+η(δ)λ [V (δ)− δqref ] dδ (11)
subject to, for all δ,
V ′(δ) = q(δ), (6)
where η(δ) satisfies η(δ) ≥ 0, η(δ)λ [V (δ)− δqref ] = 0. Notice that η(δ)λ is the Lagrangian
multiplier associated to the participation constraint of type δ.12
We define ζ(δ) =
∫ δ
δ
η(s)ds. It is shown in the proof of Proposition 1 that η is a probability
distribution on
[
δ, δ
]
, and that, therefore, ζ(δ) is a c.d.f. on
[
δ, δ
]
.
Lemma 4.1.
The output level is such that:
S ′ [q(δ)]− (1 + λ)(β − δ)− kδ + λF (δ)− ζ(δ)
f(δ)
= 0. (12)
11See Basov (2005), pages 124-126.
12The participation constraint must be binding for some δ, otherwise the government could increase
expected social welfare by reducing the transfer to the manager (across all types) without violating the
participation constraint.
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Proof. See Appendices B.1 and B.2.
Observe, from the incentive compatibility conditions (6) and (8), that V (δ) is a convex func-
tion. Since the reservation utility is linear in δ, it follows that the participation constraint
is binding over an interval, which we denote by [δ0, δ1].
13
When the participation constraint is binding over an open interval, V (δ) = δqref , from the
first incentive compatibility constraint (6), we have q(δ) = qref and t(δ) = 0.
Proposition 1 (Output function).
The participation constraint (10) either:
(i) binds at δ, implying downward distortion, q(δ) < q∗c (δ), for all δ > δ;
(ii) binds at [δ, δ1], implying downward distortion, q(δ) < q
∗
c (δ), and a negative monetary
transfer, t(δ) < 0, for all δ > δ1 (for δ ∈ [δ, δ1], q(δ) = qref and t(δ) = 0);
(iii) binds at δ, implying upward distortion, q(δ) > q∗c (δ), for all δ < δ;
(iv) binds at
[
δ0, δ
]
, implying upward distortion, q(δ) > q∗c (δ), and a positive monetary
transfer, t(δ) > 0, for all δ < δ0 (for δ ∈
[
δ0, δ
]
, q(δ) = qref and t(δ) = 0);
(v) binds at an interval [δ0, δ1], implying: upward distortion and negative monetary trans-
fer for δ ∈ [δ, δ0]; and downward distortion and positive monetary transfer for δ ∈
[
δ1, δ
]
(for δ ∈ [δ0, δ1], q(δ) = qref and t(δ) = 0).
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
The output level is strictly increasing with δ over the two intervals [δ, δ0] and
[
δ1, δ
]
, being
constant and equal to qref in [δ0, δ1]. When the output level is strictly increasing, the
monetary transfer, t(δ), is strictly decreasing.
In the next section, we characterize the optimal contract in the case of a quadratic social
value function of output and a uniform distribution over types.
13This includes, for example, the case in which the participation constraint is only binding at one of the
extremes of the interval (δ0 = δ1 = 0 or δ0 = δ1 = 1).
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5 Characterizing the optimal contract
5.1 Exogenous reference output
In order to illustrate our general results, we now assume that the social value of output is
S(q) = αq − 1
2
q2 and that δ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
With complete information, the solution is:
q∗c = α− (1 + λ)(β − δ)− kδ,
t∗c = δ(qref − q∗c ).
Assumption 1 (iii), which in this case is α > (1+λ)β, ensures that the complete information
output is always positive.
The participation constraint binds if and only if δ ∈ [δ0, δ1], with (Appendix C.2):
δ0 = max
{
0,
−α + qref + (1 + λ)β
1 + 2λ− k
}
and δ1 = min
{
λ− α + qref + (1 + λ)β
1 + 2λ− k , 1
}
.
For δ ∈ [δ0, δ1], bunching occurs at the reference output level (q∗(δ) = qref ). Outside the
interval, there is no bunching.
The solution is fully characterized by the following propositions.
Proposition 2 (The intermediate reference output case).
When qref ∈ [α− (1 + λ)β, α + (1 + λ)(1− β)− k]:
(i) for δ ∈ [δ0, δ1] ⊂ [0, 1], there is bunching, with q(δ) = qref , V (δ) = δqref and t(δ) = 0;
(ii) for δ ∈ [0, δ0), there is upward distortion (q(δ) > q∗c ) and a positive monetary transfer
(t(δ) > 0), with
q(δ) = α− (1 + λ)β − kδ + (2λ+ 1)δ, (13)
V (δ) = [α− (1 + λ)β] δ + (2λ+ 1)δ
2
2
− kδ
2
2
+
[qref − α + (1 + λ)β]2
2(1 + 2λ− k) , (14)
t(δ) = −(2λ+ 1)δ
2
2
+
kδ2
2
+
[qref − α + (1 + λ)β]2
2(1 + 2λ− k) . (15)
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(iii) for δ ∈ (δ1, 1], there is downward distortion (q(δ) < q∗c ) and a negative monetary
transfer (t(δ) < 0), with
q(δ) = α− (1 + λ)β − kδ + (2λ+ 1)δ − λ, (16)
V (δ) = [α− (1 + λ)β − λ] δ + (2λ+ 1)δ
2
2
− kδ
2
2
+
[qref + λ− α + (1 + λ)β]2
2(1 + 2λ− k) , (17)
t(δ) = −(2λ+ 1)δ
2
2
+
kδ2
2
+
[qref + λ− α + (1 + λ)β]2
2(1 + 2λ− k) . (18)
Proof. See Appendices C.1, C.3 and C.4.
When δ increases from 0 to 1, the output level first increases (until δ0), being larger than
the complete information output, then it is constant (between δ0 and δ1), and then increases
again, being lower than the complete information optimal output (figure 1).
Figure 1: The output and the utility function of the firm with k = 0, α = 3, λ = 0.5, β = 1.2,
qref = 1.5, δ0 = 0.15, δ1 = 0.4.
The following propositions describe what happens when the reference output qref is outside
the interval defined in Proposition 2.
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Proposition 3 (The large reference output case).
When qref > α+ (1 +λ)(1−β)− k, there is bunching at the top. Output, utility of the firm
and monetary transfer are described by equations (13), (14) and (15) (upward distortion)
when δ ∈ [0, δ0), and by q(δ) = qref , V (δ) = δqref and t(δ) = 0 (bunching and binding
participation constraint) when δ ∈ [δ0, 1] (see figure 2).
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
Figure 2: The output and the utility function of the firm with k = 0, α = 3, λ = 0.5, β = 1.2,
qref = 2.8, δ0 = 0.8.
Proposition 4 (The small reference output case).
When qref < α − (1 + λ)β there is bunching at the bottom. Output, utility of the firm and
monetary transfer are described by equations (16), (17) and (18) (downward distortion)
when δ ∈ (δ1, 1], and by q(δ) = qref , V (δ) = δqref and t(δ) = 0 (bunching and binding
participation constraint) when δ ∈ [0, δ1] (see figure 3).
Proof. See Appendix C.4.
We illustrated the case in which the government incorporates the non-monetary component
of the manager’s utility in the welfare function (k = 0). If the government does not care
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Figure 3: The output and the utility function of the firm with k = 0, α = 3, λ = 0.5, β = 1.2,
qref = 1.1, δ1 = 0.2.
about the bureaucratic bias (k = 1), the interval over which the output is constant and
the participation constraint of the manager is binding moves to the right and, outside this
interval, the output and the manager’s utility are lower.
We can use our results to study how the output responds to changes in cost, for a given
reference output level. An increase in marginal cost, β, entails a reduction of the output
level both when the manager’s marginal utility is low (δ ∈ [0, δ0]) and when it is high
(δ ∈ [δ1, 1]). However, for intermediate values (δ ∈ [δ0, δ1]), output does not change in
response to (small) changes in cost.
Finally, we show that a sufficient condition for social welfare, W (δ), to be positive for all
δ ∈ [0, 1] (which implies that the regulator is happy to offer a contract to all possible types)
is that the reference output is not larger than twice the optimal output in the absence of
bureaucratic bias.
Proposition 5 (The government’s participation constraint).
If qref ≤ 2 [α− (1 + λ)β], then the social welfare is positive, W (δ) > 0, for all δ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. See Appendix C.5.
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Figure 4: The social welfare with k = 0 and k=1 in which α = 3, λ = 0.5, β = 1.2, qref = 1.5.
In the figure 4, we observe that, if the government cares about the bureaucratic bias (k = 0),
the social welfare increases with δ. If the government disregards the bureaucratic bias in
the welfare function (precisely when k increases), the social welfare decreases in interval
δ ∈ [0, δ0), is constant in δ ∈ [δ0, δ1], and increases in δ ∈ (δ1, 1].
5.2 Endogenous reference output
Up to now, we considered that the reference output was exogenous. Remember that the
reference output determines the (type-dependent) reservation utility. It is natural to assume
that this reference output is the expected output of the population of firms, with respect
to the managers’ types. Since this expected value depends on the reference output itself,
the equilibrium value of the reference output is to be determined by stipulating that the
reference output should equal the expected output, qref = Eδ [q(δ)].
With quadratic social value of output and a uniform distribution over types, whenever the
reference output is assumed to take an intermediate value (an assumption to be checked
later), the expected output is given by:
Eδ [q(δ)] =
∫ δ0
0
[α− (1 + λ)β − kδ + (2λ+ 1)δ] dδ +
∫ δ1
δ0
qref dδ
+
∫ 1
δ1
[α− (1 + λ)β − kδ + (2λ+ 1)δ − λ] dδ. (19)
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Equating (19) to qref , we obtain the unique equilibrium value of qref as
q∗ref = α− (1 + λ)β +
1
2
(1 + λ− k). (20)
Observing that q∗ref ∈ [α− (1 + λ)β, α + (1 + λ)(1− β)− k], we validate, using Proposition
3, our initial assumption about the reference output taking an intermediate value.
We can now prove that this the only possible equilibrium. Indeed, if we assume that the
reference output is large, we have
Eδ [q(δ)] =
∫ δ0
0
[α− (1 + λ)β − kδ + (2λ+ 1)δ] dδ +
∫ 1
δ0
qref dδ, (21)
and equating (21) to qref , we obtain as candidate equilibrium value qref = α− (1 + λ)β +
1−k
2
+ λ. We immediately observe that this value is lower than α + (1 + λ)(1 − β) − k,
contradicting our assumption that we were in the large reference output case.
Similarly, if we assume that the reference output is small, we have
Eδ [q(δ)] =
∫ δ1
0
qrefdδ +
∫ 1
δ1
[α− (1 + λ)β − kδ + (2λ+ 1)δ − λ] dδ, (22)
and equating (22) to qref , we obtain as candidate equilibrium value qref = α+ (1 + λ)(1−
β)− k. We immediately observe that this value is larger than α− (1 + λ)β, contradicting
our assumption that we were in the small reference output case. This is summarized in
Proposition 6 below.
Proposition 6 (Endogenous reference output).
The unique endogenous reference output level is given by equation (20). It is such that only
the “intermediate reference output case” occurs at equilibrium.
Making the reference output endogenous in this way leads us to reconsider what has been
said at the end of the previous section. It is true that, for a given reference output, the firms
may not respond to “small” changes in cost when their managers’ types are intermediate.
However, the (endogenous) reference output itself will adjust in response to changes in cost.
Then, it makes sense to distinguish short-run and long-run output elasticity with respect
to changes in cost. In the short-run, the reference output is given, for instance because the
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contracts have already been signed between the regulators and the managers, and output
can be insensitive to changes in costs or taxes for a whole category of firms. However, in
the long run, as the old managers leave their jobs, new contracts are passed referring to the
new reference output, and output converges to its new equilibrium value. It follows that
the long-run output elasticity is going to be larger than the short-run one.
6 Concluding remarks and extensions
In this paper, we analyzed the optimal regulation of a bureaucratic firm when the bureau-
cratic bias (manager’s utility of output) is private information and the reservation utility
is type-dependent. We showed that the optimal output function is such that output is dis-
torted upward when the manager has a low preference for output, downward when he/she
has a high preference for output and equals his/her reference output when he/she has an in-
termediate preference for output and the individual rationality constraint is binding. When
the government does not care about the non-monetary part of the manager’s utility, the
interval over which the output is constant and the participation constraint is binding moves
to the right, while, outside this interval, equilibrium output is lower.
These results have implications for cost sensitivity of output. In the short-run, when the
reference output can be considered as exogenous, the output of firms whose managers’ types
are intermediate are not going to respond to small variations in their unit cost of production,
while the output of firms whose managers’ types are either small or large will respond in
the expected direction.14 The overall sensitivity of output to cost variations depends on
the relative numerical importance of these three groups of firms, or, using the terminology
of this model, on the length of the interval [δ0, δ1]. In the long-run, the reference output
adjusts progressively to its new equilibrium level, and so the output elasticity is larger.
For the sake of simplicity, we assumed throughout this paper that the government can
observe the unit cost of production, and we simultaneously ignored the issue of moral
hazard. Analyzing a model where both the marginal cost and the manager’s utility for
output are private information would be fruitful. This will be the subject of future research.
14This looks like the result obtained by Sweezy (1939) in the very different framework of “the kinked
oligopoly demand curve”.
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A Appendix: Problem of the firm
A.1 Differentiability of output, transfer, and utility functions
In this section, we prove that if (5) holds, then the output, transfer and value functions are
almost everywhere differentiable.
Lemma 1. δ˜ < δ ⇒ q(δ˜) ≤ q(δ).
Proof. If (5) holds, then:
t(δ) + δq(δ) ≥ t(δ˜) + δq(δ˜),
t(δ˜) + δ˜q(δ˜) ≥ t(δ) + δ˜q(δ).
Adding the two inequalities, we obtain:(
δ − δ˜
) [
q(δ)− q(δ˜)
]
≥ 0.
Then, δ − δ˜ > 0 implies that q(δ)− q(δ˜) ≥ 0.
Lemma 2. U(δ˜, δ), as a function of δ˜, is nondecreasing on [δ, δ] and nonincreasing on
[
δ, δ
]
.
Proof. Let us show monotonicity on [δ, δ]. Assume that δ˜ < δ′ < δ and, by way of contra-
diction, U(δ˜, δ) > U(δ′, δ), that is:
t(δ˜) + δq(δ˜) > t(δ′) + δq(δ′).
On the other hand, we know that a firm with a bureaucratic bias δ′ prefers to announce δ′
rather than announce δ˜. Thus:
t(δ′) + δ′q(δ′) ≥ t(δ˜) + δ′q(δ˜).
Adding the last two equations, we obtain:
(δ − δ′)
[
q(δ˜)− q(δ′)
]
> 0 ⇒ q(δ˜)− q(δ′) > 0.
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Which is in contradiction with Lemma 1.
Monotonicity on
[
δ, δ¯
]
can be proved in the same way.
Lemma 3. t(δ) + δq(δ) is nondecreasing.
Proof. Let δ′ < δ. We need to show that t(δ) + δq(δ) > t(δ′) + δ′q(δ′).
By definition:
t(δ′) + δ′q(δ′) = t(δ′) + δq(δ′)− (δ − δ′)q(δ′) = U(δ′, δ)− (δ − δ′)q(δ′).
Using Lemma 2:
t(δ′) + δ′q(δ′) ≤ U(δ, δ)− (δ − δ′)q(δ′) ≤ t(δ) + δq(δ).
Lemmas 1 and 3 imply that the functions q(δ) and V (δ) = t(δ)+δq(δ) are a.e. differentiable.
Hence, t(δ) is also a.e. differentiable.
A.2 Second incentive compatibility condition
The local second-order condition of the maximization program is:
∂2U(δ˜, δ)
∂δ˜2
∣∣∣∣∣
δ˜=δ
≤ 0 ⇔ t′′(δ) + δq′′(δ) ≤ 0. (23)
We want to show that (given the first-order condition) it is equivalent to q′(δ) ≥ 0.
Notice that, under the first incentive compatibility condition (5), the value function is:
V (δ) = t(δ) + δq(δ). (24)
Evaluating the derivative of (24) and equating to (6), we obtain:
t′(δ) + δq′(δ) = 0. (25)
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The derivative of (25) is:
t′′(δ) + q′(δ) + δq′′(δ) = 0. (26)
Subtracting (26) from (23), the local second order condition becomes:
q′(δ) ≥ 0.

A.3 The local second order condition implies the global one
Lemma 4. If the second incentive compatibility condition (8) is (strictly) satisfied, ∀δ ∈[
δ, δ
]
, then ∂
2U(δ˜,δ)
∂δ∂δ˜
is also (strictly) positive, ∀δ, δ˜ ∈ [δ, δ].
Proof. Recall that:
U(δ˜, δ) = t(δ˜) + δq(δ˜).
The partial derivative with respect to δ˜ yields:
∂U(δ˜, δ)
∂δ˜
= t′(δ˜) + δq′(δ˜).
Therefore:
∂2U(δ˜, δ)
∂δ∂δ˜
= q′(δ˜).
Lemma 5. If ∂U(δ˜,δ)
∂δ˜
is increasing in δ, then the local second order condition implies the
global one.
Proof. The local second order condition implies that announcing the truth δ˜ = δ gives a
local maximum for the firm of type δ. Is there another announcement, δ′ 6= δ, that also
satisfies the first order condition? That is, does there exist δ′ 6= δ such that:
∂U(δ˜, δ)
∂δ˜
∣∣
(δ′,δ) =
∂U(δ˜, δ)
∂δ˜
∣∣
(δ,δ) = 0?
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This would imply that
∂U(δ˜, δ)
∂δ˜
∣∣
(δ′,δ) =
∂U(δ˜, δ)
∂δ˜
∣∣
(δ′,δ′) = 0.
But this is inconsistent with the strict monotonicity of ∂U(δ˜, δ)/∂δ˜ with respect to its
second argument. Weak monotonicity implies that any announcement in the interval [δ′, δ]
is equally optimal. In any case, announcing δ is optimal.
B Appendix: Problem of the government
B.1 Necessary and Sufficient conditions
We first ignore the second order incentive compatibility condition (8) but we shall check
later that the solution of the problem (11) is the solution of the general problem (9).
Necessary conditions
The Hamiltonian is:
H = {S [q(δ)]− (1 + λ)(β − δ)q(δ)− λV (δ)− kδq(δ)} f(δ) + µq(δ) +
η(δ) [V (δ)− δqref ] , (27)
where µ(δ) is the co-state variable associated with (6) and η(δ) is the multiplier associated
with the participation constraint.
The first order conditions imply:
µ′(δ) = λ [f(δ)− η(δ)] , (28a)
V ′(δ) = q(δ), (28b)
S ′ [q(δ)]− (1 + λ)(β − δ)− kδ + µ(δ)
f(δ)
= 0, (28c)
η(δ) [V (δ)− δqref ] = 0, (28d)
µ(δ) = µ(δ) = 0, (28e)
η(δ) ≥ 0, V (δ) ≥ δqref . (28f)
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Equation (28a) is the equation of motion of the co-state variable. Equation (28d) is the
complementary slackness condition. Equation (28e) gives the transversality conditions.
Integrating equation (28a) we obtain:
µ(δ) = λ [F (δ)− ζ(δ)] , (29)
and using (28e):
µ(δ) = λ [F (δ)− ζ(δ)] ⇔ 0 = −λζ(δ)⇔ ζ(δ) = 0, (30)
µ(δ) = λ
[
F (δ)− ζ(δ)] ⇔ 0 = λ [1− ζ(δ)]⇔ ζ(δ) = 1. (31)
These last two equations imply that:∫ δ
δ
η(δ)dδ =
∫ δ
δ
f(δ)dδ = 1, (32)
meaning that η(·) is a probability distribution on [δ, δ]. Denote the corresponding c.d.f.
by ζ(δ) =
∫ δ
δ
η(s)ds.
Replacing equation (29) into (28c), we find that output is such that:
S ′ [q(δ)]− (1 + λ)(β − δ)− kδ) + λF (δ)− ζ(δ)
f(δ)
= 0. (33)
The only difference with respect to the complete information case is the last term. It should
be clear that ζ(δ) = 1 implies downward distortion and ζ(δ) = 0 implies upward distortion.
Note that if the participation constraint (6) is not binding on some open interval (δa, δb)
then ζ(·) is constant on it, since ζ ′(δ) = η(δ) = 0.
Sufficient condition
The second order derivative of the Hamiltonian (27) is: ∂
2H
∂q2
= S ′′ [q(δ)] < 0.
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B.2 The solution of the unconstrained problem is the solution of
the general problem
We now check that the condition which was omitted in the problem (11), q′(δ) ≥ 0, is
satisfied. Differentiating equation (12) with respect to δ, we obtain:
q∗
′
(δ) = −
1 + λ− k + λ
(
1− η(δ)
f(δ)
)
− λf ′(δ)[F (δ)−ζ(δ)]
f(δ)2
S ′′[q(δ)]
.
The assumption of monotone hazard rates are used here. Observe that:
d
dδ
[
f(δ)
F (δ)
]
< 0 ⇔ f
′(δ)F (δ)
f(δ)2
< 1
and
d
dδ
[
f(δ)
1− F (δ)
]
> 0 ⇔ f
′(δ) [F (δ)− 1]
f(δ)2
< 1.
For δ < δ0, we have η(δ) = 0 and ζ(δ) = 0, implying that:
q∗
′
(δ) = −
1 + 2λ− k − λf ′(δ)F (δ)
f(δ)2
S ′′[q(δ)]
> −1 + λ− k
S ′′[q(δ)]
> 0.
For δ > δ1, we have η(δ) = 0 and ζ(δ) = 1, implying that:
q∗
′
(δ) = −
1 + 2λ− k − λf ′(δ)[F (δ)−1]
f(δ)2
S ′′[q(δ)]
> −1 + λ− k
S ′′[q(δ)]
> 0.
When the participation constraint is binding, q∗(δ) = qref and, therefore, q∗
′
(δ) = 0.
We have found that q∗
′ ≥ 0, which implies that (8) is verified. The solution of the uncon-
strained problem (11) is also the solution of the general problem (9). 
B.3 Characterization of the output function
Proof. In the main text, we have explained why one of these three situations must occur.
In case (i), since ζ(δ) = 1,∀δ ∈ (δ, δ], the output, for δ > δ, is given by:
S ′ [q(δ)]− (1 + λ)(β − δ)− kδ) = λ1− F (δ)
f(δ)
> 0.
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The left term is null in the case of complete information, therefore we have q(δ) < q∗c (δ).
In case (ii), since ζ(δ) = 1,∀δ ∈ (δ1, δ], the output, for δ > δ1, is given by:
S ′ [q(δ)]− (1 + λ)(β − δ)− kδ) = λ1− F (δ)
f(δ)
> 0,
which, for the same reason, implies that q(δ) < q∗c (δ).
The first incentive compatibility constraint, V ′(δ) = q(δ), and the binding participation
constraint, V (δ) = δqref , imply that, for δ ∈ (δ, δ1), we have q(δ) = qref and, thus, t(δ) = 0.
The first incentive compatibility constraint is equivalent to t′(δ) + δq′(δ) = 0. Then, the
second incentive compatibility constraint implies that, for δ > δ1, we have t(δ) < 0.
Cases (iii), (iv) and (v) can be analyzed similarly.
C Appendix: The linear-quadratic case
We first characterize the optimal output level and the manager’s equilibrium utility over
the interval [δ0, δ1], where the participation constraint is binding. We determine the precise
values of δ0 and δ1 and we also study the two other situations over the two intervals where
the participation constraint is not binding: δ ∈ [0, δ0) and δ ∈ (δ1, 1].
C.1 When δ ∈ [δ0, δ1]
When δ ∈ [δ0, δ1] the participation constraint is binding V (δ) = δqref .
From the first incentive compatibility constraint (6) we have
q(δ) = qref , ∀ δ ∈ [δ0, δ1] .
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C.2 The values of δ0 and δ1
From Proposition 1 (iii) we know that:
ζ(δ) =
1
λ
[α− qref − (1 + λ) β − kδ] +
(
2 +
1
λ
)
δ. (34)
Since ζ(0) = 0 and η(δ) = 0 for all δ < δ0, it must be that ζ(δ0) = 0, replacing in equation
(34), we get the value of δ0:
δ0 = max
{
0,
−α + qref + (1 + λ)β
1 + 2λ− k
}
. (35)
When qref ≥ α − (1 + λ)β − kδ = q∗(0), we obtain δ0 ≥ 0, whereas, when qref < α − (1 +
λ)β − kδ, bunching occurs at the bottom of the interval, i.e. δ0 = 0.
Since ζ(1) = 1 and η(δ) = 0 for all δ > δ1, it must be that ζ(δ1) = 1, replacing in equation
(34), we get the value of δ1:
δ1 = min
{
λ− α + qref + (1 + λ)β
1 + 2λ− k , 1
}
. (36)
When qref ≤ α + (1 + λ)(1 − β) − kδ, we obtain δ1 ≤ 1, whereas, when qref > α + (1 +
λ)(1− β)− kδ bunching occurs at the top of interval, i.e, δ1 = 1.
C.3 When δ0 > 0 and δ ∈ (0, δ0)
When δ0 > 0 and δ ∈ (0, δ0), the participation constraint is not binding then ζ(δ) is constant
on this interval, since η(δ) = 0. From Proposition 1 (ii) we obtain:
q(δ) = α− (1 + λ)β − kδ + (2λ+ 1)δ.
Integrating the equation (6) we get the firm’s utility function:
V (δ) =
∫ δ
0
q(s)ds = [α− (1 + λ)β] δ − kδ
2
2
+ (2λ+ 1)
δ2
2
+ C,
where C is an integration constant. To determine C, we use the continuity of V at δ = δ0.
From point C.1, we know that V (δ0) = δ0qref . To determine C is:
C = δ0qref − [α− (1 + λ)β] δ0 + kδ
2
0
2
− (2λ+ 1)δ
2
0
2
,
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and δ0 is given by equation (35), we obtain C =
[qref−α+β(1+λ)]
2
2(1+2λ−k) . The firm’s utility is:
V (δ) = [α− (1 + λ)β] δ + (2λ+ 1)δ
2
2
− kδ
2
2
+
[qref − α + (1 + λ)β]2
2(1 + 2λ− k) .
C.4 When δ1 < 1 and δ ∈ (δ1, 1)
When δ1 < 1 and δ ∈ (δ1, 1), the participation constraint is not binding then ζ(δ) is constant
on this interval, since η(δ) = 0. From Proposition 1 (i) we obtain:
q(δ) = α− (1 + λ)β − kδ + (2λ+ 1)δ − λ.
Integrating the equation (6) we get the firm’s utility function:
V (δ) =
∫ 1
δ
q(s)ds = [α− (1 + λ)β − λ] δ − kδ
2
2
+ (2λ+ 1)
δ2
2
+ C,
where C is an integration constant. To determine C, we use the continuity of V at δ = δ1.
From point C.1 we know that V (δ1) = δ1qref . To determine C is:
C = δ1qref − [α− (1 + λ)β − λ] δ1 + kδ
2
1
2
− (2λ+ 1)δ
2
1
2
,
and δ1 is given by equation (36), we obtain C =
[qref+λ−α+β(1+λ)]
2
2(1+2λ−k) . The firm’s utility is:
V (δ) = [α− (1 + λ)β − λ] δ + (2λ+ 1)δ
2
2
− kδ
2
2
+
[qref + λ− α + (1 + λ)β]2
2(1 + 2λ− k) .

C.5 The government’s participation constraint
The regulator’s welfare when the agent’s type is δ is:
W (δ) = S [q (δ)]− (1 + λ)(β − δ)q(δ)− kδq(δ)− λV (δ).
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Differentiating and accounting for the incentive compatibility condition (6) we obtain:
W ′(δ) = {S ′ [q (δ)]− (1 + λ)(β − δ)− kδ} q′(δ) + (1− k) q(δ). (37)
By the condition (12) we know that:
S ′ [q(δ)]− (1 + λ)(β − δ)− kδ = −λF (δ)− ζ(δ)
f(δ)
.
Notice that here F (δ) = δ. Replacing in (37), we obtain:
W ′(δ) = (1− k)q(δ)− λ [δ − ζ(δ)] q′(δ).
Let us consider the three possible cases:
1. δ ∈ [δ0, δ1], it easy to check that W ′(δ) = (1− k)qref .
2. When δ ∈ [0, δ0], we know that ζ(δ) = 0, q(δ) = α − (1 + λ)β + (1 + 2λ − k)δ (see
equation (22)) and q′(δ) = 1 + 2λ− k. It follows that
W ′(δ) = (1− k)[α− (1 + λ)β + (1 + 2λ− k)δ]− λδ(1 + 2λ− k).
This is strictly negative when k = 1. When k = 0, this simplifies to W ′(δ) = α− (1 +λ)β+
δ(1 + 2λ)(1− λ) which is strictly positive under Assumption 2 if λ < 1.
3. When δ ∈ [δ1, 1], we know that ζ(δ) = 1, q(δ) = α − (1 + λ)β + (1 + 2λ− k)δ − λ (see
equation (25)) and q′(δ) = 1 + 2λ− k. It follows that
W ′(δ) = (1− k)[α− (1 + λ)β + (1 + 2λ− k)δ − λ] + λ(1− δ)(1 + 2λ− k).
This is always strictly positive.
Now, (i) When k = 1, W (δ) takes its minimum value for δ ∈ [δ0, δ1], where it equals
αqref − 12q2ref − β(1 + λ)qref . In order to guarantee that the participation constraint of
the principal is always satisfied it is then enough to assume that qref ≤ 2y where y =
α− β(1 + λ).
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(ii) When k = 0, assuming λ < 1 and α−(1+λ)β > 0 (from Assumption 2), W (δ) takes its
minimum value for δ = 0 where it equals 1
2+4λ
[−λq2ref + y(2λqref + (1 + λ)y)]. It is enough
to suppose that qref ≤ 2y to guarantee that this value is strictly positive and, consequently,
that the principal’s participation constraint is never binding. 
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